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UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES?
POVERTY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND THE DYNAMICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Jane S. Schacter*
As we think about the future role the judicial branch will play in our
governance, we might consider one important function of the courts: addressing
claims of constitutional inequality. In this Article, I explore this question by
juxtaposing two claims of inequality that have been pressed by advocates—one
concerning sexual orientation, the other concerning poverty. These two contexts
are undoubtedly different in ways both numerous and significant. The lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights movement is today, while the
constitutional movement for the rights of the poor was yesterday. 1 The LGBT
movement has won major Supreme Court victories in its biggest cases of the last
generation—Romer v. Evans, 2 Lawrence v. Texas, 3 and, most recently, United
States v. Windsor, 4 and it seems to be on a constitutional roll of sorts. The
constitutional movement for the poor, by contrast, won some significant Supreme
Court victories in the 1960s and early 1970s in cases like Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 5 Shapiro v. Thompson, 6 and Goldberg v. Kelly, 7 but then lost its most
ambitious claims in Dandridge v. Williams 8 and San Antonio Independent School

* © 2014 Jane S. Schacter. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School. I owe special thanks to Juliet Brodie, who is deeply knowledgeable and wise
about law and poverty and has helped me think through many of the issues addressed here.
I also thank Lydia Gray and Matt Higgins for excellent research assistance. I benefited
greatly from the lively discussions at the symposium and from a faculty workshop at
Stanford Law School.
1
Issues of “income inequality” have been on the more recent public agenda, but these
questions have typically been framed in terms of disparities between and among those in
different economic strata, as opposed to a concern for the poorest among us. See generally,
e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013) (arguing that the American
economic system creates inequality and threatens democracy).
2
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a broadly drawn anti-gay-rights initiative).
3
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a ban on consensual same-sex sodomy).
4
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down a portion of the federal Defense of Marriage
Act).
5
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a state poll tax).
6
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a one-year waiting period for welfare benefits
imposed on new state residents).
7
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (treating the receipt of welfare benefits as a property interest
and requiring a hearing before termination of those benefits).
8
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state cap on welfare benefits to families over a
certain size, even though larger families received fewer benefits).
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District v. Rodriguez. 9 It never really recovered. Indeed, it is not uncommon to
hear laments like the one sounded in Justice Marshall’s dissent in James v.
Valtierra, 10 which excoriated the majority for the toothless standard of review it
applied and suggested that equal-protection claims made on behalf of poor people
receive “no scrutiny whatsoever.” 11
The differences between these two movements, moreover, go well beyond
matters of timing and win-loss record. One difference pertains to the claims
themselves. Any ambitious equality-based challenge in the realm of poverty poses
a fundamental challenge to the liberal state and the market. By contrast, the
constitutional movement for LGBT rights has largely concerned formal equality
and can, at least as framed by some, coexist easily with a libertarian agenda. 12
Another core difference relates to the line between “affirmative rights” and
“negative liberties.” 13 This line is not as bright as it is sometimes made out to be.
Some opponents of marriage equality, for example, argue that according a right to
same-sex marriage is a far cry from invalidating laws criminalizing same-sex
intimacy and unjustifiably crosses a line into “affirmative recognition.” 14 Even
granting that there is some malleability in the affirmative/negative distinction,
poverty- and sexual-orientation-based equality claims do seem to straddle a line of
that sort, with robust constitutional protections against poverty more consistent
with the kind of affirmative, social democratic norms that have never had much
uptake in this country.
There are also important distinctions involving what courts might be called
upon to do in order to remedy these two kinds of inequality. While the institutional
legitimacy of courts invalidating bans on same-sex marriage and same-sex sodomy
has been contested, the remedy for those constitutional violations is time limited
9

411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting a challenge to a state education funding formula that
disadvantaged the poorest districts).
10
402 U.S. 137 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11
Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny
Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, and Dialogic
Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to
apply meaningful constitutional protections to the poor).
12
See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1140–
41 (2004) (noting that many libertarians view Lawrence as “a libertarian revolution”).
13
See generally Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement
of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN L. REV. 1521, 1522 (2010)
(exploring basis for “so-called positive rights [that] embrace guarantees to goods and
services such as public schooling, health care, and a clean environment); Robin West,
Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 221 (2006) (contrasting “negative duties
to restrain from acting” with “positive, affirmative duties to pass laws so as to achieve
various welfarist ends”).
14
These arguments are addressed, for example, in David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right
to Public Recognition of Family Relationships? The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51
VILL. L. REV. 891, 892 (2006) and Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1059, 1073–75 (2004).
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and discrete, 15 and there are not nearly the layers of remedial complexity that go
along with attempts, in the name of constitutional principle, to equalize school
funding or guarantee minimum provision. When combined with what some view
as the illegitimate, “zero sum” aspect of redistributive efforts by governmental
actors, the particular resistance that courts might encounter in more aggressively
addressing poverty comes clearly into view.
All of these differences are readily apparent and significant. They suggest
some important reasons why the Supreme Court has done far less to address
inequality that is based on wealth compared to that which is based on sexual
orientation. Nevertheless, despite—or perhaps because of—these differences, I
suggest that we can draw some larger insights about the dynamics of courts and
constitutional inequality claims by thinking about these sets of constitutional
claims in relation to one another. After reviewing the history, I will suggest that the
contrast underscores, and gives some shape and texture, to three such dynamics:
the different ways that politics and public opinion can shape judicial decision
making, the increasingly significant role of state courts in forging constitutional
norms, and both the failures and the fading of the traditional tiers of equalprotection scrutiny.
I. HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The history of the constitutional movement for LGBT equality is a fairly
recent one that continues to unfold. For our purposes, the trajectory can be traced
fairly quickly. 16 That is far less true for the history of poverty-related claims, and I
will accordingly lay out the history of that movement, and the key Supreme Court
decisions, in more detail.
A. Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Equality
The first major Supreme Court decision on LGBT equality came some
seventeen years after the Stonewall uprising in New York, an event often taken to
have inaugurated an organized national movement for LGBT equality. That first
case was Bowers v. Hardwick, 17 which turned on liberty, not equal protection. But
as has long been true in the realm of sexual orientation, liberty and equality claims
15

This was somewhat less true when civil unions were a more prominent option than
they seem to be today. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding a state
constitutional violation in restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples, but allowing the
legislature to remedy the violation by enacting comprehensive civil unions); see also Lewis
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding the same as Baker).
16
More detailed histories can be found in MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET
TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, at x–
xii (2013); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1153 (2009).
17
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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are intertwined in many ways. Certainly Bowers, upholding the constitutionality of
a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy, powerfully implicated the equality of gay
people and was criticized for the inequality it seemed to accept. 18
Bowers was followed by a pair of cases that bore on gay equality in a different
way. These were cases reversing the decision of a state court holding that a state or
local antidiscrimination law protected the right of gay persons to participate in a
Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade or the Boy Scouts. First in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 19 then in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 20 the Supreme Court upheld claims that those who wished to
exclude gay participants were protected by the First Amendment. In between these
cases, however, the constitutional tide began to turn. In Romer v. Evans, the Court
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that banned any nondiscrimination protection for lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons in that state.21 The
decision was doctrinally cryptic. It appeared to apply a highly unorthodox—and
unexplained—version of rational-basis review, and it was silent on the continuing
fate of Bowers. Nevertheless, it reflected the first application of the Equal
Protection Clause to protect LGBT persons.
Seven years after Romer, Lawrence v. Texas expressly overruled Bowers and
wove into its due-process analysis ideas traditionally associated with equality—
ideas about dignity, respect, and the injustice of stigma. 22 When Lawrence was
decided in 2003, a heated debate about same-sex marriage was well underway in
the country, having started a decade earlier when the Hawaii Supreme Court issued
an unexpected decision signaling an openness to a right of same-sex couples to
marry under that state’s constitution. 23 In its language, however, Lawrence
attempted to steer clear of the marriage issue and limit its focus to laws banning
consensual adult sodomy. 24 Ten years after Lawrence, the Court squarely
addressed same-sex marriage for the first time. 25 By this time, several states had
legalized same-sex marriage, and public opinion had steadily grown to be
significantly more supportive of marriage equality than it was when Lawrence was
decided. 26 In United States v. Windsor, 27 the Court struck down the portion of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that barred the federal government from
18

See generally, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000).
19
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
20
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
21
517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995).
22
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2002).
23
KLARMAN, supra note 16, at xi, 48, 75.
24
539 U.S. at 578 (noting that the case did not “involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”).
25
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
26
See generally Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1185 (2013).
27
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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recognizing any same-sex marriages. The opinion relied on the Equal Protection
Clause and used the doctrine of federalism as a piece of supporting evidence for its
belief that DOMA violated constitutional equality norms. 28 Noting that the federal
government had historically accepted a state’s definition of marriage, the Court
found that the government’s decision to abandon that practice in this single context
supported an inference of discrimination. 29 At the same time the Court decided
Windsor, it declined to rule on the merits of Hollingsworth v. Perry, 30 a challenge
to California’s Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”). The state’s voters approved Prop 8 in
2008, and the measure wiped out a state supreme court decision in favor of
marriage equality. 31 Prop 8 was struck down in the federal district court, but the
Supreme Court found that because the governor and the attorney general refused to
appeal the district court’s decision, the petitioners did not have standing. 32 Thus,
the decision of the district court stood.
Since Windsor and Perry came down in June 2013, many more states have
legalized same-sex marriage, and many more judges all over the country have
struck down state laws denying marriage equality. 33 Given the sheer number of
cases all over the country now challenging restrictive marriage laws, it seems
inevitable that another case on same-sex marriage will be back in the Supreme
Court before too long.
B. Poverty and Constitutional Claims
If the discussion is framed in terms of the movements for LGBT and poor
peoples’ rights, a reader could be forgiven for asking about the latter: what
movement? While there are active national movements today in some areas that I
will discuss—the adequacy of school funding being perhaps the most salient 34—
one is hard-pressed to identify any ongoing, overarching social movement seeking
equality for the poor as a class, much less one with an active constitutional

28

Id. at 2692–93.
See id. at 2693.
30
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
31
Id. at 2659.
32
Id. at 2668.
33
Masuma Ahuja et al., The Changing Landscape on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH.
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/same-sex-marriage/ (last
updated May 15, 2014); Richard Socarides, The Growing Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Gay-Marriage Ruling, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/onli
ne/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/the-widening-impact-of-the-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-ruli
ng.html.
34
Another example is the national “Civil Gideon” movement seeking improved
access to justice for the poor in the context of civil claims. For background on both, see
JULIET M. BRODIE ET AL., POVERTY LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2014).
29
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docket. 35 This is clearest in the context of the federal courts. 36 Over the last few
decades, while an array of cases relating to LGBT inequality have regularly
commanded the headlines, 37 there have been precious few Supreme Court rulings
on constitutional inequality claims pressed by poor persons qua poor persons, and
none that got much national attention or were connected to an ongoing social
movement. Any number of major decisions over that time period may, of course,
be said to have powerful implications for low-income persons in contexts like
voting rights, 38 criminal law, 39 immigration, 40 and congressional power, 41 to name

35

For an insightful analysis on the decline of constitutional advocacy on behalf of
poor people, see Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People
from Equal Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1029–33 (2012), and Nice,
supra note 11, at 629–36.
36
For a discussion of constitutional claims in state courts, see infra Part II.B.
37
In the last twenty years, for example, the Court has heard and decided eight major
cases focusing on a constitutional issue related to LGBT equality—either a constitutional
claim protecting LGBT’s or a constitutional claim seeking to limit the nondiscrimination
protection afforded to LGBT’s: Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971 (2010); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. 547 U.S. 47
(2006); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, &
Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
38
See generally, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down
section 4 of the Voting Rights Act); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181
(2008) (upholding a state law requiring registered voters to present a valid governmentissued photo ID before casting a ballot).
39
See generally, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (holding that a state
may use silence in response to questioning as evidence of guilt in a criminal trial if the
defendant fails to expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege); Stephen B. Bright,
Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life
and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816 (1997) (arguing that Supreme
Court cases subsequent to Gideon have “[made] a mockery of the right to counsel”);
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625,
640–41 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court decisions that have limited claims based on
ineffective assistance of counsel).
40
See generally, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating a
state law that authorized local law enforcement officers to enforce national immigration
laws); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state law denying education
funding for undocumented immigrant children).
41
See generally, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608
(2012) (holding that Commerce Clause did not give Congress authority to pass the
Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause, and that Spending Clause did not
authorize expansion of Medicaid in that Act)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (striking down a key provision of the Violence Against Women Act).
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a few. But I can count only two Supreme Court rulings that have squarely
presented constitutional equality claims focused on poverty. 42
It was not ever thus. In the unlikely event that I conceived of this paper topic
in 1967, the “what constitutional movement” question would have been lodged in
the opposite direction. The Stonewall riots did not even kick off the modern gay
rights movement until 1969, and the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement
on homosexuality, in a statutory interpretation case, gave no hint that change was
on the judicial or political agenda. In Boutilier v. INS, 43 the Court upheld the INS’s
deportation of a gay man under a statutory provision barring entry to all
immigrants “afflicted with psychopathic personality.” 44 The agency interpreted
that language to include all “homosexuals and sex perverts.” 45 Ignoring affidavits
from psychiatrists who knew Clive Boutilier and attested to the fact that he was
well adjusted, the Court’s opinion concluded that “Congress used the phrase
‘psychopathic personality’ not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to
exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts.” 46
By contrast, 1967 was a time of great activity, and seemed like one of great
promise, for a movement asserting the rights of the poor. Michael Harrington’s
Other America was published a few years earlier, in 1962. President Lyndon
Johnson had declared the War on Poverty in his State of the Union address in
1964, and this was followed by enactment of a number of significant pieces of
federal antipoverty legislation in rapid succession. In the two years following
President Johnson’s address, he aggressively supported, and Congress passed, for
example, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 47 which created an Office of
Economic Opportunity and led to creation of programs such as VISTA, the Job
Corps, the predecessor to the Legal Services Corporation, Head Start, and many
others; the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 48 creating Medicaid and
Medicare; the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 49 funding
primary and secondary education and addressing educational access; and
legislation creating the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 50 among
others. And, in an arresting contrast to the legislative politics of today, all this (and

42

See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a state law where the
welfare benefits received by new residents were limited for one year to the level paid in the
former state of residence); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (guaranteeing a trial
transcript without fee in appeal on the termination of parental rights).
43
387 U.S. 118 (1967).
44
Id. at 118.
45
Id. at 121.
46
Id. at 122.
47
Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508.
48
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 375.
49
Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
50
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451.
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more) was done at the same time Congress was enacting the landmark Civil Rights
Act of 1964 51 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. 52
Organized movements involving poverty activists, and various political
strategies seeking fundamental change, were in full swing. 53 Both lawyers and law
professors were actively engaged with these issues in this time frame. Welfare
rights lawyers worked in coordinated (if not always smooth) advocacy for what
lawyer Edward Sparer called a “right to live”—that is, guaranteed minimum
benefits. 54 Charles Reich’s The New Property appeared in the Yale Law Journal in
1964. 55 Well known for laying the groundwork for an expanded conception of
property that triggered due-process protections, it also contained arguments that
could be marshaled in support of an affirmative entitlement to subsistence
benefits. 56 Frank Michelman devoted his 1969 foreword to the Harvard Law
Review’s Supreme Court issue to detailing the case for a minimum right of
subsistence, grounded in the Constitution. 57 He set out a theory that focused on
deprivation and minimal provision rather than equality per se, but his focus was
squarely on meaningfully addressing the plight of poor people.
The Supreme Court had entered the arena as well. Building on a few key prior
cases addressing the rights of indigent people in the context of interstate
migration 58 and access to the courts, 59 a six-justice majority of the Supreme Court
51

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244.
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445.
53
See generally Nat’l Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y.
1969) (challenging a state law that substantially reduced welfare benefits); RICHARD A.
CLOWARD & FRANCES FOX PIVEN, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS (1977); RICHARD A.
CLOWARD & FRANCES FOX PIVEN, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE (1971); Richard A. Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, The Weight of the Poor: A
Strategy To End Poverty, THE NATION, May 2, 1966, at 510 (articulating the “flood the
system” strategy, which sought to hasten social and economic change by overwhelming the
government bureaucracy with impossible demands).
54
Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT
THEY ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65, 83–84 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971) (arguing that
constitutional “ground rules” guarantee a “right to live”). This movement is chronicled at
length in MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 (1993); see also Edward S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty:
A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964) (calling for neighborhood lawyers to
play an active role in the war on poverty).
55
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
56
See ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT,
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 97 n.29 (1997).
57
See generally Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). For a contemporary reflection on, and
reframing of, Michelman’s thesis, see generally Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional
Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203 (2008).
58
See generally Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (striking down a law
criminalizing the transportation of indigents into California).
52
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in 1966 struck down Virginia’s poll tax and used language strongly suggesting that
it was poised to hold wealth a suspect classification, as it had done for race. In
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 60 the Court said:
It is argued that a State may exact fees from citizens for many
different kinds of licenses; that if it can demand from all an equal fee for
a driver’s license, it can demand from all an equal poll tax for voting. But
we must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting,
is limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or
color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race are traditionally disfavored. 61
Despite this language, Harper’s other shoe never dropped. The Court did not go on
to hold wealth a suspect classification. It did, however, take further steps toward
according significant constitutional protection to the poor with two important
decisions, both written by Justice Brennan.
One was Shapiro v. Thompson, 62 decided in 1969, which held that
Connecticut’s one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it interfered with the “fundamental right of
interstate movement” and could not be justified by its apparent goal to discourage
indigent persons from moving to the state. 63 Although the doctrinal focus of the
case was the interest in interstate mobility, the reasoning emphasized the
“creat[ion of] two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each
other except that one is composed of residents who have resided [in the state] a
year or more, and the second of residents who have resided [in the state] less than
a year.” 64 The Court further held that this was no basis for denying “welfare aid
upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to
subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.” 65
59

See generally Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (striking down a law
preventing indigent criminal defendants from acquiring transcripts for appeal); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (striking down a law denying court-appointed counsel on
appeal from conviction). The “Griffin-Douglas” doctrine has spawned a jurisprudence of
its own, permitting the government to require some fees, while invalidating others. It is
grounded in a blend of equal-protection and due-process norms. The 1963 decision in
Gideon was not cited by the Court in Harper and was not relevant as a doctrinal matter, but
it was as important in terms of impact on poor people as anything else that happened in this
time period.
60
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
61
Id. at 668 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
62
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
63
Id. at 638.
64
Id. at 627.
65
Id.

876

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO.4

Welfare rights advocates who were actively pursuing the goal of a “right to
live” closely watched Shapiro. 66 The case had been set for reargument in 1968
after the Court found itself deadlocked. Archibald Cox was recruited to take over
the case from the young welfare rights attorneys who had litigated it and argued it
the first time. The decision generated a “euphoric reception” 67 from welfare
lawyers because it brought the concept of fundamental rights, and the strict
scrutiny triggered by such rights, to the realm of poverty law. Welfare lawyers
thought it might be a key first step on the way to the core right to subsistence. In
this sense, Shapiro suggested themes that Michelman would press in his
foreword, and, in fact, he found support for his argument in that opinion. 68
The other major victory came the next year when the Court decided
Goldberg v. Kelly, 69 a canonical case holding welfare benefits to be property
interests for purposes of the Due Process Clause, and requiring welfare agencies
to provide a hearing of some kind before terminating benefits. Though a
procedural and not substantive case, the idea of benefits as a property interest,
along with some of the language in Goldberg, provided further encouragement to
the welfare rights movement that it was on its way to more substantive
constitutional protection. Consider some of the language in Justice Brennan’s
opinion about poverty—language virtually unthinkable today:
From its founding, the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the
dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to
recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their
poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions, has
significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public
assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence,
can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise
that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and
insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to
“promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity.” The same governmental interests that
counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted
provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary
hearings are indispensable to that end. 70

66

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
DAVIS, supra note 54, at 80.
68
Michelman, supra note 57, at 40–47.
69
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
70
Id. at 264–65 (citations omitted).
67
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Soon after Goldberg, however, the air seemed to go out of the balloon. Two
subsequent cases best capture what might now be seen as the turning point. 71 The
first, Dandridge v. Williams, 72 was decided literally weeks after Goldberg and
rejected a challenge to a state’s maximum family benefit—a ceiling imposed
irrespective of the number of dependent children in the family. The second, San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 73 was decided in 1973 and
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Texas school-funding scheme in which
poorer districts received a fraction of the funding provided to more affluent ones.
Both decisions came down during a time of change for the Court. Four
appointees of President Richard Nixon took their seats between 1969 and 1971.
The first—Justice Burger, replacing Justice Warren—was on the Court for both
Dandridge and Rodriguez and voted with the majority in both cases. The
remaining three—Justice Blackmun (replacing Justice Fortas), Justice Powell
(replacing Justice Black), and Justice Rehnquist (replacing Justice Harlan)—were
on the Court for Rodriguez. All voted to reject the constitutional claim, and Justice
Powell wrote the majority opinion in Rodriguez. It is an open question how their
predecessors would have voted in these cases, but there is little doubt that these
appointments moved the Court in a more conservative direction, and that the
rulings were broadly in sync with the judicial views pressed by President Nixon in
his campaigns.
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For a fuller set of relevant cases before and after this time, see generally Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state statute that denied public education to
undocumented immigrant children); Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
(holding that states are not required to provide appointment of counsel for indigent parents
in every parental-status termination proceeding); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (striking down a state law requiring one year of residence as a condition of
receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at the county’s expense); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that the rule requiring appointment of counsel for
indigent state defendants on their first appeal would not be extended to discretionary state
appeals); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding a statute that required
petitioners in bankruptcy proceedings to pay court fees); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973) (upholding a court filing fee levied on poor persons seeking review of decisions by
the state welfare division reducing their welfare payments); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972) (rejecting due process challenge to a state procedure for eviction proceedings,
while striking down a double bond requirement under equal protection); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding state’s differential methods for funding in
different benefit programs); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding due
process prohibits a state from denying access to courts for marriage dissolution solely due
to an inability to pay court fees); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding a state
law requiring voter approval for housing projects); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(holding that aid dispersed under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children could not be
withheld because a “substitute father” visited the family on weekends).
72
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
73
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Whereas Goldberg was about welfare procedures, Dandridge was about
substantive benefits, and it was clear from the Dandridge opinion that the Court
saw the two issues quite differently. The brief filed on behalf of the welfare
recipients in Dandridge sought strict scrutiny, citing cases involving both
fundamental rights and suspect classifications. 74 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion
in Dandridge emphatically rejected that idea. Although there was no analysis of
the factors in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products 75 that have come
to be part of heightened-scrutiny doctrine, 76 Justice Stewart underscored that equal
protection claims involving welfare policy would receive the lowest form of
scrutiny. Noting that “the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of
this Court,” 77 the opinion said that:
the invalidation of state economic or social regulation as “overreaching”
would be far too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the
Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws “because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought.” 78
The reference to the Lochner era was clear, and in case there remained any doubt,
the Court made its bottom line on standard of review explicit:
To be sure, the cases cited, and many others enunciating this
fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the
main involved state regulation of business or industry. The
administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the
most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We
recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases
and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different
constitutional standard. 79
The lawyers working for the welfare rights movement had hoped that Dandridge
would build on Shapiro and provide another meaningful step toward the “right to
74

Brief for Appellees, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (No. 131), 1969
WL 119896, at *44.
75
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
76
See Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens
of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2011) (noting that Graham v.
Richardson in 1971 was the first time the Court expressly linked strict scrutiny to footnote
four).
77
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
78
Id. at 484 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955)).
79
Id. at 485.
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live” they had set as their goal. Instead, they were handed what they took to be an
“unmitigated loss,” 80 one that decisively undercut these hopes.
The second major defeat came in 1973, when the Court, in Rodriguez,
rejected a challenge to the Texas school financing system. That system relied
heavily on local property taxes to fund education. The funding plan produced large
interdistrict disparities in per-pupil educational spending, and there was a large gap
between property-rich school districts and the property-poor school districts in
which the Mexican American plaintiffs lived. The plaintiffs asserted two claims,
each inspired to some degree by Harper. The first was that the system amounted to
unconstitutional wealth discrimination and should be struck down, using strict
scrutiny, as an impermissible classification based on wealth.81 The second was that
it deprived students of their fundamental right to an education 82—a right that, like
the right to vote protected in Harper, could be seen as “preservative of other basic
civil and political rights.” 83
When the Rodriguez case was filed in 1968, the idea of challenging schoolfunding schemes was still relatively new. An influential article authored by three
law professors—John Coons, William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman—appeared
the next year and argued for a principle of wealth neutrality in state educational
finance systems. 84 Their proposed principle was designed in anticipation of
institutional objections to judicial involvement in this sphere. It proposed to bar as
unconstitutionally discriminatory the use of local school-district wealth as a basis
for funding, while leaving states to determine another way to structure their
school-finance plans.
When the Rodriguez litigation began, lawsuits were also initiated in California
and Illinois. The California litigation produced a major victory when the California
Supreme Court, in the first of many chapters of Serrano v. Priest, 85 struck down
California’s school funding system. Applying both the Equal Protection Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment and the analogous state constitutional provision, the
court found wealth a suspect classification and also identified a fundamental
interest in education that independently triggered strict scrutiny. 86 The decision
attracted national attention and inspired new constitutional litigation in state courts
around the country. And, only a few months after Serrano, the three-judge court in
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DAVIS, supra note 54, at 132.
Brief for Appellees at 8, 37–39, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332).
82
Id.
83
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
84
John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for
State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 419–20 (1969).
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487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
86
Id. at 1250, 1258.
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Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District 87 followed the California
Supreme Court’s blueprint in striking down the Texas system. 88
These claims, however, were all rejected by the Supreme Court. 89 Rodriguez
is often cited for the proposition that wealth is not a suspect classification, but that
is not quite what Justice Powell’s opinion said. 90 The Court found that the Texas
system did not classify based on wealth at all, because of the possibility that poorer
citizens could live in districts with richer tax bases (such as districts with industrial
property). 91 Still, it is clear enough from Justice Powell’s papers that he had the
larger issue in mind. His notes include this provocative reference: “In a free
enterprise society . . . we could hardly hold that wealth is suspect. This is
communist doctrine but is not even accepted (except in a limited sense) in socialist
countries.” 92
Justice Powell, who had served on local and state boards of education in
Virginia, also rejected the idea that there is any federal constitutional right to
education and appealed to the localist tradition in education. 93 He also emphasized
that the Texas funding system, in any event, did not absolutely deprive any student
of access to school. 94 In this way, the Rodriguez ruling was a powerful repudiation
of core arguments in the constitutional movement to address poverty.
II. WHAT THE CONTRASTING HISTORIES SUGGEST ABOUT THE DYNAMICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY CLAIMS
A. Politics, Public Opinion, and Constitutional Law
Normative disputes about constitutional interpretation aside, it is relatively
uncontroversial to say that the Supreme Court has often moved in sync with public
opinion. This is not true for all constitutional issues, but it can be seen in the realm
87

337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
Id. at 285–86.
89
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29, 37 (1973).
90
For a careful tracing of how the Court’s failure to endorse the proffered wealth-asa-suspect-classification claim morphed, over time, into the erroneous idea that the Court
had considered and explicitly rejected that claim, see Nice, supra note 35, at 1029–49.
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Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23 (“[T]here is reason to believe that the poorest families
are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts.”).
92
Richard Schragger, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the Legal Geography of School
Finance Reform, in CIV. RTS. STORIES 85, 99 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds.,
2008).
93
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40 (“We are asked to condemn the State’s judgment in
conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for
local interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it
has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often admonished against
such interferences . . . .”).
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Deprivation of access to school was absolute in the later decision of Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
88

2014]

UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES?

881

of various debates about inequality. 95 This is not a new or revolutionary idea—
certainly not to political scientists 96—but it has become more mainstream in legal
scholarship over time. 97 It becomes far more controversial when stated in terms of
the causal effect of public opinion on the Court, or vice versa, but the descriptive
alignment on many issues is there to be seen.
To be sure, there will always be controversies about what polls measure and
how to conceive of the relevant public opinion. Nevertheless, there is evidence of
alignment between public attitudes and the Supreme Court’s major decisions on
LGBT issues. If one consulted surveys of opinion on the issues decided in Romer
in 1996 (banning antidiscrimination protections for LGBTs), 98 Lawrence in 2003
(criminalizing sodomy), 99 and Windsor in 2013 (same-sex marriage), 100 one would

95

For an issue-by-issue breakdown that shows different patterns of public opinion
support for constitutional decisions in different contexts, see Nathaniel Persily,
Introduction, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3, 5–7 (Nathaniel
Persily et al. eds., 2008).
96
See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (explaining widely held view
among political scientists that the Supreme Court is a national policy maker).
97
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 381
(2009) (“The justices in Brown v. Board of Education argued they were protecting
constitutional rights, but once again it was evolving national views that supported the
Court’s judgment and enabled its enforcement.”); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1996) (“By the time Roe was
decided in 1973, public opinion on the abortion issue had already been dramatically
transformed . . . . Seventeen states had recently passed legislation liberalizing their abortion
regulations.”). Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism
and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 391 (2007) (discussing the theory that “the
Court broadly reflects society, so its chief tendency is ‘to constitutionalize consensus and
suppress outliers’” (quoting MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 449 (2004))); Gerald N.
Rosenberg, The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements in the
Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1147,
1147–49 (2004) (rebutting the “conventional story” that “the 1964 Civil Rights was largely
a result of the 1954 Brown decision”).
98
See, e.g., Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP (Mar. 31, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx#3 (reflecting that Gallup polling on “equal
rights in terms of job opportunities” for gay people showed a rise from 56% support in
1977 to 84% in November 1996, a few months after Romer was decided). The anti-gayrights initiative invalidated in Romer went beyond the realm of employment, and there are
questions about how people would have understood this poll question. Nevertheless, there
was strong support for “equal rights” in one of the main arenas affected by Amendment 2.
99
See, e.g., Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 235, 241 (Jack Citrin et al. eds., 2008). The authors also
addressed the reverse question—the effect of Lawrence on subsequent public opinion—
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find rising public support for the rights at issue in those cases. This general theme
has been stressed in scholarship on LGBT issues, with the rise over time of public
support for LGBT equality. 101 This rise in support was especially pronounced
during the first fifteen years or so of the modern same-sex-marriage movement—
roughly from 1993 to 2008. During this period, many observers lamented the
policy backlash triggered by litigation to secure marriage equality and cited it as
the inevitable byproduct of courts—in that case, state courts—getting too far ahead
of the public. 102 The current state of public opinion on same-sex marriage, in
which polls now commonly register majority support for marriage equality, has
likewise been a regular part of analysis of Windsor. 103 Lurking underneath
statements of this kind is often an implicit kind of progressive historical
triumphalism—that is, the idea that courts will catch up to the public and then take
their place on the slow but steady road of progress toward meaningful equality.
That may or may not prove true in the context of LGBT rights, but it has by no
means proven universally true. 104 One needs to look no further than the recent
Shelby County v. Holder 105 decision to see some evidence to the contrary.
The trajectory of the constitutional movement pressing the rights of the poor
plainly supports no triumphalist narrative—quite the contrary. Indeed, at first
blush, rather than reflecting an area in which the Supreme Court moved after
public opinion and the political process moved, it might seem a bit of the reverse.
After all, the political process was actively engaged in the War on Poverty in the
mid-1960s. The President was highly vocal, and large congressional majorities
were passing, at a brisk pace, ambitious federal antipoverty legislation.106 This was
all taking place at about the time Harper was decided (1965) and only a few years
before Shapiro (1969). This quality and quantity of activity might seem to
evidence political and public support for a robust public response to poverty.
and, interestingly, found that the Lawrence decision temporarily “disrupted the upward
trend in public opinion.” Id.
100
See, e.g., Gay Marriage: Key Data Points from Pew Research, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 11, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/gay-marriage-key-data-point
s-from-pew-research (finding that in 2013, 50% of Americans supported gay marriage
while 43% opposed it); Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above
50% in U.S., GALLUP POL. (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marria
ge-support-solidifies-above.aspx (showing that 53% of Americans believe the law should
recognize same-sex marriages).
101
See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 211; Egan et al., supra note 99, at 237–41;
Schacter, supra note 76, at 1388–89.
102
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 339–54 (2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 475 (2005).
103
See Schacter, supra note 26, at 1199.
104
See generally PERSILY, supra note 95 (exploring public opinion in different
constitutional contexts).
105
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down section 4 of the Voting Rights Act).
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See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
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In other words, there are reasons to believe that the Court would not have
been manifestly far ahead of the public or political process by deciding Dandridge
differently or at least in building in some affirmative way on Harper or Shapiro.
True, President Johnson was out of office when Dandridge was decided in 1970,
and the “war” on poverty, as such, was over. But the presidential Commission on
Income Maintenance Programs issued a report in 1969 supporting a “negative
income tax.” 107 That proposal competed with other plans in a thoroughly
mainstream discussion about guaranteed income support. Some 1,300 economists
from 150 different institutions had petitioned Congress in 1969 in support of a
“national system of income guarantees and supplements.” 108 These developments
might well have been thought sufficient to create a judicial audience more
sympathetic to robust protections for the poor.
There are any number of potential ways to explain Dandridge and Rodriguez
in terms of doctrine. The language in Harper that seemed on the edge of formally
declaring wealth as a suspect classification could be limited by the context of
voting, one that is arguably sui generis. And, striking down a poll tax in the
context of voting is a long way from mandating subsistence payments or
equalizing education finding. Similarly, despite their rhetorical flourishes, neither
Shapiro nor Goldberg created an entitlement to benefits, standing alone. Shapiro
addressed only withholding from new-residents benefits the state had already
elected to give existing residents, and Goldberg concerned only hearing rights once
an entitlement had been created by state law. And, perhaps the daunting
institutional implications of constitutionalizing education funding or further
constitutionalizing welfare benefits put a brake on any momentum that seemed to
have taken hold with Harper and Shapiro. In short, both Dandridge and Rodriguez
might simply have been more of a doctrinal stretch than they appeared to the
plaintiffs’ lawyers—although it is worth noting that both cases had only five-vote
majorities, so the lawyers’ aspirations were hardly fanciful. 109
107

On the negative income tax and associated proposals, see Felicia Kornbluh, Is
Work the Only Thing that Pays? The Guaranteed Income and Other Alternative AntiPoverty Policies in Historical Perspective, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 61, 66–68, 76–82
(2009). On the difference between negative income tax and the earned income tax credit,
see Jesse Rothstein, Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax
Incidence, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 177, 177–78 (2010).
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Richard K. Caputo, United States of America: GAI Almost in the 1970s but
Downhill Thereafter, in BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE AND POLITICS: INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE VIABILITY OF INCOME GUARANTEE 265, 266
(Richard K. Caputo ed., 2012) (quoting Economists Urge Assured Income, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 1968, at 1). The larger discussion included even Milton Friedman, who authored a
proposal of this kind in 1962. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 190–96
(1962).
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Decided April 6, 1970, Dandridge was only 5-3, not 5-4, because Justice
Blackmun had not yet been sworn in. Harry A. Blackmun, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT
CHICAGO-KENT C. OF L., http://www.oyez.org/justices/harry_a_blackmun (last visited May
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The more important point I would like to press is that, examined more closely,
the poverty cases are consistent with the idea that courts often move in sync with
the political process and public opinion. There are, at the threshold, some grounds
to question whether President Johnson’s War on Poverty had solid political and
public support even at the time it was being waged. 110 And, as race tensions began
to rise in the mid-1960s, opposition began to consolidate and crystallize. 111
A few specific points about the links between race and poverty deserve
emphasis. The first relates to welfare policy. There is a longstanding fault line in
public opinion about antipoverty programs that is consistent with Dandridge and
would, in fact, predict the decision’s result. Polling over time shows majorities
consistently supportive of the idea that government should do more to assist the
poor but quite hostile to welfare programs. 112 One way to reconcile this apparent
inconsistency is to interpret it as reflecting public support for spending more public
funds to help individual poor persons find jobs but hostility for categorical income
support. 113 Another is to map these attitudes onto a longstanding conceptual
distinction in public understanding of poverty that separates the “deserving” from
the “undeserving” poor. Michele Landis Dauber’s work about New Deal
constitutionalism shows this distinction at work in the context of disaster relief, 114
and Joel Handler examines it in the context of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and its predecessor programs. 115 Relatedly, there is evidence that public
attitudes about welfare have been profoundly shaped by race, or beliefs about race.
Public reaction to the rise in antipoverty programs unfolded against a history of
large-scale migration of blacks from the south to the urban north, and it became
particularly salient in the mid-1960s, as race riots began to erupt and controversies
over spending funds from the War on Poverty increasingly appeared in the
media. 116 In The Color of Welfare, sociologist Jill Quadagno traces the
entwinement of race and welfare policy over time and argues that the War on
Poverty was itself conceived, in part, with race in mind, and then thwarted by
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Amitai Etzioni, Consensus and Reforms in the “Great Society”, 40 SOC. INQUIRY
113, 113 (1970) (“Great Society slogans aroused aspirations and hopes which previously
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Role in Welfare, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 257, 257 (1975).
113
See id. at 31–39.
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See JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM,
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racial dynamics in the country. 117 In his 1999 book Why Americans Hate Welfare,
political scientist Martin Gilens finds that perceptions of poverty became
increasingly racialized starting in the mid-1960s. 118 Based on comprehensive
analysis of public-opinion data, and content analysis of media coverage of poverty
over time, Gilens shows that media photographs in the many stories about poor
people during this time increasingly featured blacks. 119 This coincided with more
and more Americans seeing poverty as essentially a black problem, and with rising
opposition to welfare as an unwise subsidy to the undeserving poor. 120 Gilens
likewise mines polling data and finds strong support for the conclusion that
stereotypical negative attitudes about blacks, and an associated belief that welfare
beneficiaries were not deserving, reflected “central elements in generating public
opposition to welfare.” 121
Looking at public opinion with all of these complex undercurrents in mind,
then, Dandridge does not look at all out of sync with public attitudes. Indeed, it
might be the willingness of the Court in Shapiro to hold as it did that seems more
the anomaly. 122
Moving from welfare to school finance, there are reasons to think that racial
dynamics may also have helped shape public attitudes in that context. Here,
however, the historical evidence of public opinion is limited, so this remains more
hypothesis than argument. I have been unable to find much on public attitudes
toward inequality in school finance at or around the time of Rodriguez. But there
are two suggestive studies in later time periods, though neither involved a large
sample. One 1991 study of attitudes surrounding school finance reform in Texas,
for example, found that attitudes about race played a significant role in shaping
survey respondents’ views about school-finance reform, irrespective of whether the
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And, in a sense, that anomaly persists beyond Shapiro and Dandridge. In 1999, at
a time when welfare had long been under siege and had been fundamentally changed on the
federal level with welfare reform, the Supreme Court decided Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999). In Saenz, the Court both reframed the Shapiro right (by moving it from the Equal
Protection Clause to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)
and expanded it (by barring a California state law that did not deny benefits to new
residents but did limit them to their former state’s benefit level for the first year of
residence). Id. at 500–11. The Saenz ruling was surprising, largely because it seemed to
revive a clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that had been dead since the Slaughterhouse
Cases in 1873. See id. at 511–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). It might also be seen as
surprising in light of the trajectory of public policy toward welfare and public attitudes
toward welfare programs. As with Shapiro, though, Saenz was a limited ruling and did not
approach any free-standing entitlement to benefits.
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reform would financially help or hurt the respondent’s own district. 123 This same
study, along with another survey done in New Jersey in 1990, 124 also found that
whites had an exaggerated view of the extent to which school finance reform
would benefit blacks, in particular. 125
Moreover, it is quite plausible to think that ideas about race would play a role
in shaping public opinion in this area because issues about race and schools were
very much in the air, principally in disputes about busing and desegregation. The
link becomes apparent if we restate the Rodriguez issue at a higher level of
generality—whether, say, courts ought to disturb the relative autonomy of
suburban schools because of concerns about urban schools. If understood in those
terms, we can easily see why public opinion about school finance in 1973 might be
intertwined with, or affected by, attitudes about desegregation and busing. In 1972,
busing was registering only 20% support among all respondents in a poll—and this
was up from 14% in 1970. 126 President Nixon had made opposition to busing a
signature part of his election appeals in 1968 and 1972. 127 By 1973, with four
Nixon appointees seated, the Court was in the midst of a transition in its busing
jurisprudence. It was moving away from the broad remedial discretion approved in
the 1971 decision, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Election. 128 The
1973 decision in Keyes v. School District No. 1 129 emphasized the centrality of the
de jure-de facto distinction, and the 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley 130 barred
interdistrict remedies in the absence of proof of an interdistrict violation. Against
this background, and with the limited evidence available in mind, there are reasons
to suspect that Rodriguez was reasonably consistent with public opinion.
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B. The Significant Role of State Courts
I have been focusing here on the role of the U.S. Supreme Court, but neither
constitutional movement can be fully understood without accounting for the role of
state courts, applying state constitutions. There are some notable temporal
distinctions in the two contexts, but they do not negate the main point that state
courts have been a force to be reckoned with in relation to these constitutional
movements. In the context of LGBT and at least some poverty-related rights, the
“parity” debate that was once triggered by Justice Brennan’s call for a more robust
state constitutionalism 131 seems to have been answered in the affirmative by
examples of state courts acting where federal courts have not—or have not yet.
In the LGBT context, the most vivid example of state courts outpacing their
federal counterparts is in the marriage domain. It was the Hawaii Supreme Court
that was the first to act on a claim of marriage equality in the early 1990s. For the
next fifteen years, constitutional marriage equality litigation was, by design, filed
only in state courts. 132 Between 1993, when Hawaii decided Baehr v. Lewin, 133 and
2013, when the Supreme Court decided Windsor and Perry, 134 a number of state
supreme courts decided state constitutional marriage-equality claims, with more of
them ruling in favor of marriage equality or mandating civil unions than rejecting
the claims. 135 The deliberate decision to confine marriage litigation to state courts
largely held until the Olson-Boies team went to federal court in 2009—over the
objection of LGBT rights groups—to challenge Prop 8. 136 The motivation for
avoiding the federal courts was not a subtle one; the fear was of going to the
Supreme Court too early and risking an adverse precedent.137
The role of the state courts is clearest in the marriage context, but it began
before that. Between the time when Bowers upheld the Georgia sodomy law
(1986) 138 and Lawrence struck down the Texas ban (2003), 139 four state supreme
131
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courts struck down criminal sodomy bans under their state’s constitution.
Improbably enough, these were the supreme courts of Kentucky, Arkansas,
Montana, and Georgia itself. 140 These courts joined the state supreme courts that
had already overturned sodomy laws before Bowers. 141
The area where state courts have played the most active role in the realm of
poverty is with respect to educational funding. Unlike in the case of same-sex
marriage, this role was not a proactive strategy to avoid the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the landmark California state court litigation in Serrano was filed the same
year that Rodriguez was filed in federal court, and the sweeping Serrano opinion
provided a blueprint for the federal district court decision in Rodriguez that ruled
Texas’s system unconstitutional. Interestingly, while Serrano was big national
news and inspired some other state cases to be filed around the country, it did not
have the same rapid-fire nationalizing effect as the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993
decision portending imminent legalization of same-sex marriage for the first
time. 142 Some of this may be explained by the fact that there was (in Rodriguez)
already a federal case in the pipeline and thus a foreseeable date when the U.S.
Supreme Court might rule on the school-finance question. In addition, the Burger
Court’s halt of the Warren Court’s trajectory was still young and coming into view,
so the very idea of strategic avoidance of the Supreme Court was not yet part of the
left’s litigation calculus.
There are, moreover, many factors specific to marriage equality that can
explain why same-sex marriage so quickly became a national issue. One is the
issue of interstate marriage recognition, which made the actions of one state
potentially relevant to the remaining forty-nine. Another is that the supporters and
opponents of gay rights were already fully mobilized and active by 1993, so the
Hawaii decision was a little like throwing something highly flammable into an
active fire. 143 By contrast, it would appear that supporters and opponents of
equalizing state school-finance systems got somewhat organized and mobilized
because of rulings like Serrano and Rodriguez, rather than having been so before
them. The same-sex marriage issue also had a pronounced partisan divide from the
outset. This is somewhat true of school finance cases, but less so. To the extent that
school finance lawsuits might generally be associated with racial integration of the
schools and especially busing, that issue had a partisan skew that was made
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apparent in the 1968 and 1972 elections. 144 But still, there was not, in 1973, the
same fully elaborated structure of political conflict on education finance as there
was about busing and the aggressive pursuit of school desegregation.
In any event, the state courts ultimately emerged as the principal venue for
educational-finance litigation. But the emergence came after Rodriguez, not—as in
the case of marriage—before the Supreme Court ever ruled. Only one other
Serrano-type case was filed before Rodriguez—in New Jersey, and it produced a
victory for the plaintiffs in the state. 145 After Rodriguez, though, litigation was
filed in several additional states. This litigation came in waves. Between 1973 and
1989, with the coordination of a national “equity network” funded by the Ford
Foundation and others, lawsuits focusing on equality in school finance were filed
in nineteen additional states. 146 Six were victorious for plaintiffs, but thirteen were
not. 147 In 1989, however, a landmark ruling in Kentucky, Rose v. Council for
Better Education, Inc., 148 brought a new kind of educational finance case—one
focusing on educational adequacy rather than equality, and involving more
innovation in remedies. 149 Overall, educational finance lawsuits have reached the
high courts of forty-three states and have produced twenty-six victories and
seventeen losses for plaintiffs. 150 How to define “victory” and “defeat” in this
context is not as simple as it may sound, and there are debates ongoing about
precisely what impact these victories will have on educational outcomes for
children. 151 Unquestionably, however, since 1989, there has been a post-Rodriguez
national constitutional movement that has targeted state courts, relied on education
clauses in state constitutions, and secured relief in roughly two-thirds of the cases.
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C. The Limits of the Traditional Tiers of Scrutiny
Finally, tracking the Supreme Court’s experience with poverty and sexual
orientation reflects both significant transitions in—and problems with—the tiers of
scrutiny, and again reveals some important dynamics in contemporary
constitutional approaches to inequality.
The Court’s doctrinal approach to major equal-protection debates about race
and gender has, in both cases, been heavily bound up with the traditional three tiers
of scrutiny. In the case of race, the sharpest doctrinal disputes have concerned how
to apply the tiers of scrutiny to plans crafted to benefit racial minorities, like
affirmative action 152 or school desegregation plans.153 In the context of gender, the
disputes have focused on what constitutes a “real difference” that justifies
differential treatment of the sexes,154 along with different understandings about
how rigorous the prescribed level of scrutiny for gender distinctions is supposed to
be. 155
Language in many of the Court’s equality cases continues to refer to tiers of
scrutiny—said to encompass strict, intermediate, and rational basis—and law
students must dutifully learn the framework. But the Court has not designated a
new class or classification for formally heightened scrutiny in decades, and the
tiers have broken down in any number of ways. 156 At the time of Dandridge (1970)
and Rodriguez (1973), equal protection was generally viewed in terms of two
tiers—strict scrutiny or rational basis. What we now call intermediate scrutiny
(principally used in gender cases) did not emerge formally until 1976 with Craig v.
Boren. 157 The criteria for strict scrutiny that are now regularly cited as part of the
doctrine were still emerging when Dandridge was decided. In fact, it was another
welfare case, this one involving the denial of welfare benefits to legally resident
aliens, 158 that helped to sharpen these doctrinal criteria by first linking them to the
152
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canonical idea of “discrete and insular minorities” contained in footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 159 The doctrine continued to be
consolidated and refined and appeared as a tidy black letter list in Rodriguez,
where the Court characterized the “traditional indicia of suspectness” as whether
the affected class is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.” 160 A few weeks after Rodriguez, Justice Brennan wrote a
plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson 161 in which he argued that gender distinctions
should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 162 He fell a vote short of a majority. 163 In that
opinion, he included immutability as a relevant criterion. 164 While it has never
been formally required by the Court, it sometimes appears on the list of
requirements.
In some ways, poverty and sexual orientation have posed similar conceptual
problems for the standard approach to heightened scrutiny, but in others the two
categories of cases have diverged. Let me begin with the divergence, which
underscores a major change over time in the court’s approach to equal protection.
Recall that in Dandridge, the court was operating in a context in which scrutiny
was more like an on-off switch. Either strict scrutiny was triggered or the court
defaulted to the relaxed and highly deferential rationality review employed in
ordinary cases of economic regulation.165 The Court chose the latter, quite
explicitly. One might say about Dandridge—as Professor Julie Nice has lucidly
emphasized—that, instead of focusing on the abject political powerlessness of poor
people along every dimension, and assimilating poverty cases to footnote four of
Carolene Products, the court instead assimilated poverty to the Lochner era and
the problems raised by close scrutiny of matters economic in nature. 166 There was
no apparent consideration in Dandridge of either a formal level of scrutiny in
between strict scrutiny and rational basis, nor of the idea that rationality review
itself might be calibrated differently for the case. This was true in Rodriguez, as
well, although there the inquiry was clouded by whether the classification of
districts was one based on individual wealth at all.167 But here again, there was no
exploration of a different version of rational basis.

159

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
161
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
162
See id. at 688.
163
See id. at 678.
164
See id. at 686.
165
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485, 491 (1955).
166
See Nice, supra note 11, at 640–44.
167
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Rodriguez also declined to apply strict
scrutiny based on a fundamental right to education, a right the Court rejected. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 16–29, 35.
160

892

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO.4

The contrast with the major gay-rights cases is sharp. Parties or amici in the
major gay-rights cases pressed for formally heightened scrutiny, but in none did
the Court take up, let alone clearly resolve, the level of scrutiny issue. Romer and
Windsor use the language of rational basis but do not employ it in its traditional
form and never mention the arguments for heightened scrutiny. 168 Lawrence could
have been decided as either an equal-protection or due-process case, and it was
decided under due process. 169 It, too, seemed to use rational basis, though lower
courts have divided about what level of scrutiny was applied in the case. 170 All
three opinions were written by Justice Kennedy. They have a strong family
resemblance to one another and are marked by a pronounced doctrinal quirkiness
that has left a trail of questions. Romer was curiously silent on Bowers, which was
still good law. Lawrence made no effort to reconcile its version of substantive due
process with the more restrictive one adopted in Washington v. Glucksberg. 171
Windsor said it was limited to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, even though its
rationale about the dignity of same-sex couples and the harm to their children of
denying recognition to their marriages would seem to apply with equal or even
greater force to state laws barring same-sex marriage.
The key difference, then, is that the LGBT cases seem to have been decided in
a post-tiers world, where the nominal application of rational basis is not outcomedeterminative. By contrast, the poverty cases were decided in a context in which
the level of scrutiny virtually foretold the outcome. This is somewhat ironic in at
least one sense. Romer has often been linked to two other decisions famous as
“rational basis plus” cases. The three are sometimes called the “Moreno-CleburneRomer trilogy.” 172 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.173 used the rationalbasis standard to strike down a requirement that group homes for people with
mental retardation secure a special permit. 174 Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno 175 is the more relevant one for thinking about poverty. It was a case about
a federal regulation, and its underlying statute, denying food stamps to households
of unrelated persons. 176 It, too, applied a more muscular rational-basis standard,
finding the exclusion unrelated to the proffered purpose to avoid fraud in the
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program. 177 But the Court also emphasized the “bare congressional desire to harm”
that was suggested by comments in the legislative history reflecting Congress’s
desire to deny food stamps to “hippies” and “hippie communes.” 178 Because of this
element, the case has become known more as an equal-protection case about
lifestyle than poverty. But that was not inevitable. Given that it was decided only a
few years after Dandridge, and the same year as Rodriguez, Moreno might have
been the vehicle that led poverty—along with mental disability and sexual
orientation—to be a context in which some meaningful constitutional protections
were provided by way of careful analysis of a law using a turbocharged form of
rational-basis review. This might have included some valuable unpacking of, and
elaborating on, the meaning of the concept of animus that ran through Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer. 179
We have seen, then, how poverty and sexual orientation claims have divergent
histories with respect to standard of review. There is, however, also an interesting
point of convergence. Both poverty and sexual orientation pose definitional
challenges for traditional, class- or classification-based equal protection review.
The definitional problem associated with poverty is made a centerpiece of the
Court’s analysis in Rodriguez, which discussed at some length the reasons that the
Texas funding system did not map cleanly onto individual wealth or even,
necessarily, the property tax wealth of each district. The Court was unwilling to
accept various alternative ways to understand how the system disadvantaged
children in districts with the lowest property wealth and held that the system
discriminated against “a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the
common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts.” 180
The larger issue that hovers over Rodriguez is the daunting question of how to
define the poor. Because the Court did not see the system as flatly discriminating
against the poor, it did not have to reach this more difficult definitional question.
How would the class be defined? By some specified percentage of chosen measure
of income? If so, what percentage and what measure? By lack of access to certain
minimum goods? If so, which goods and by what metric of access? By other
criteria? It is not that there are no definitions, only that there are many plausible
ones. It is worth noting that the path from Moreno to more nuanced, contextual
analysis of individual cases could allow judicial review of programs without the
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need to answer difficult questions like these. As we have seen, however, that path
was not pursued either.
This challenge of judicially identifying a definition of who is poor may shed
at least some light on an apparent puzzle: Why, even in the twenty-three states that
have some specific textual language in their constitution about the government’s
duty or power to provide for basic welfare, 181 have most courts done nothing with
them? 182 An equally significant factor is likely political and cultural resistance to a
tradition of affirmative rights—a resistance shaped by some of the public attitudes
and perceptions about poverty and welfare discussed earlier.
Notably, there is also a set of definitional challenges in the context of sexual
orientation, albeit different ones. Debates about LGBT rights have featured, from
an early period, a debate about the origins of sexual orientation within individuals.
This has basically been a question about immutability. Political opponents of
LGBT rights have argued that sexual identity is a matter of choice and conduct
(and thus undeserving of legal protection), while many political proponents have
retorted that sexual identity is given, not chosen, and runs deeper than sexual
conduct alone (and is thus deserving of protection). 183 It is not clear that the origins
of individual sexual orientation ought to be relevant to the issue of legislative or
constitutional protection, 184 nor is it clear that the categories “nature” and “nurture”
separate as cleanly as the debate assumes. 185 Nevertheless, the immutability
181
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question continues to motivate scientific research of various forms, 186 and a
version of the question has recently arisen in a debate with First Amendment
implications about banning “conversion therapy” for young people who identify as
LGBT. 187
There is a separate set of issues relevant to defining the class of LGBT
persons that focuses not on the origins of sexual attraction in the individual, but on
the origin of the social categories used to classify people according to their sexual
object choice. These issues flow from an extensive academic literature on the
social construction of sexual identity that calls into question categories like
homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, and others. 188 Much of this literature flows
from the work of Michel Foucault, 189 but lest it seem entirely unconnected to the
Court, consider Justice Kennedy’s downright Foucauldian reference in Lawrence.
In the course of carrying out a historical analysis of sodomy regulation for
purposes of substantive due process review, Kennedy wrote:
The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on homosexual conduct may
be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars the
concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not
emerge until the late 19th century. Thus early American sodomy laws
were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit
nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest
approval of homosexual conduct. It does tend to show that this particular
form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like
conduct between heterosexual persons. 190
Despite the reference, Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence of LGBT rights has
not resisted the concept of the gay or lesbian person. To the contrary, he has
argued the centrality of sexual identity to personhood in ways at odds with the
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category critique. 191 By contrast, Justice Scalia has emphasized the distinction
between status and conduct in his dissents in the area. 192 These arguments reveal
ways in which the basic definition and conceptual place of sexual orientation in an
equal-protection jurisprudence that was developed largely to address race remain a
matter of dispute on the Court.
Some of these definitional problems might be mitigated if the focus were
shifted from class (the LGBT community, whomever that might describe) to
classification (individual sexual orientation, defined or described in the way an
individual chooses). Interestingly, however, the move from focusing on a class
(poor people as the object of protection) to classification (any lines drawn based on
income level) might instead aggravate in the context of poverty problems of the
sort reviewed here. The idea that judges must afford skeptical scrutiny whenever a
policy uses income as a line would seem to invite Justice Powell’s sort of “whither
capitalism” response to Rodriguez. It might also produce perverse outcomes if
conceptually deployed to question programs that may benefit those with lower
incomes, such as the progressive income tax.
CONCLUSION
To start where we began, there are many differences that distinguish these two
movements. The point is decidedly not to flatten these differences or to treat them
as more alike than they are. Instead, the fact that some broad themes link even
these disparate cases suggests that there are institutional insights here that can help
us think critically about the role of courts going forward. Perhaps the clearest
takeaway is that courts rarely act in a vacuum. They act in the context of other
actors (other courts, political bodies, public opinion), and their decisions are given
meaning, in part, by how these other actors, along with social movements, react.
For this reason, thinking about the role of courts in 2020 means thinking about the
interacting roles of these other actors, as well.
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